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NOTE
The Divisibility of Warranties in Insurance Policies
I. INTRODUCTION

Few purchasers of insurance are in a position to bargain for a
policy other than the one the insurer has already reduced to a
printed form. Because such policies are merely adhesion contracts,
courts have been willing to construe them in a manner most favorable
to the insured.' The need for such a construction frequently occurs
when an insurance company alleges that an insured's conduct has
violated the terms of his policy, thereby, releasing the company from
any obligation to pay the insured's claim. The most familiar technique
used by the courts is to choose the interpretation of policy language
most favorable to the insured where several interpretations are possible. Thus, interpretation of an ambiguous warranty in favor of the
insured may well result in a holding that the warranty was not
breached. Take for example the language of Chief Justice Shaw of
Massachusetts:
By a substantial compliance, we mean the adoption of precautions, if not

exactly those stated in the application, precautions intended to accomplish
the same purpose, and which may be reasonably considered equally or more
efficacious. For instance, when it is stated that ashes are taken up in iron
hods, it would be a substantial compliance, if brass or copper were substi-

tuted. So, when it is represented that casks of water, with buckets, are
kept in each story, if a reservoir were placed above, with pipes to convey
water to each story, and found by skillful experienced persons to be equally
2
efficacious, it would be a substantial compliance.

The doctrine of substantial compliance, and other rules of construction such as the rule calling for an interpretation of warranties as
being promissory rather than continuing, are familiar and frequently
applied. When applied in favor of the insured, the usual result is to
find that the insured has not breached the warranty. This note deals
with a less frequently employed tool of beneficent interpretation and
one whose thrust is different, the divisibility of warranties. The
doctrine of divisibility does not result in a finding of "no breach";
1. Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U.S. 80 (1934); Stipcich
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1928); Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co.,
136 U.S. 287 (1890).
2. Houghton v. Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins., 49 Mass. 114, 122 (1844).
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instead it admits the breach, but deems it immaterial because it3 is
not related to the risk of that type of loss which has taken place.
This note begins with a brief review of the nature of warranties
in insurance policies, and a discussion of beneficent interpretations
other than divisibility, so that the reader can understand the
operation of the divisibility doctrine in its true context. The bulk of
the note then sets out those cases in which the doctrine is properly
employed, in an attempt to demonstrate and articulate an underlying
theme which is both unified and coherent.
II.

BENEFICENT APPLICATION OF WARRANTES

A. Nature of a Warranty
Warranties are included in insurance policies to limit the risks

assumed by the insurance company. As statements concerning the
status of the subject of the policy, they create conditions of the
insurer's duty to indemnity, 4 even when they are not expressly made
conditional. By delineating the scope of a risk through the use of
warranties, an insurer has conditioned his coverage on the assumption
that the statements in the warranties are correct. Therefore, it is unnecessary for each warranty to state that its fulfillment is a condition
of coverage. Because strict interpretation of warranties resulted in
many injustices, a number of techniques have been developed to
ameliorate their effect. One of these, the doctrine of substantial
compliance, was mentioned in the introduction. Others are outlined
in the next few paragraphs.
Before discussing these approaches, however, it should be pointed
out that construction of contract language in favor of the insured
does not necessarily mean abandonment of strict interpretation. At
times, strict construction will lead to results very favorable to an
insured, and when this is true, the principle of freedom of contract
comes reasonably into play, for an insurer should be regarded as
sufficiently knowledgeable to realize what it is putting in its contracts.
An illustration of the benefits that may come to an insured by means
of strict construction occurred in a non-warranty case,5 where a
policy was enforced against the insurance company even though
the insured would receive payment without having suffered any
loss. The insured had leased and improved the premises. A fire
policy endorsement covering the improvements provided that despite
any lease or contact by the insured, the insurer would treat the
3. McCormick v. Potomac Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 302, 174 N.E. 689 (1931).
4. PATrERSON, INSURANCE 275 (1957).
5. Foxbilt, Inc. v. Citizens Insurance Co., 128 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Iowa 1955).
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insured as the sole and unconditional owner in event of damage by
fire. The improvements were subsequently damaged by fire, and they
were repaired by the landlord at no expense to the insured. These
repairs were held not to lessen or remove the insurer's liability under
the endorsement. The freedom to contract allowed in this case
seemingly ignores a concept of public policy under which some states
limit the insured's recovery to indemnification only. The courts have
justified recovery in excess of indemnification by relying on the above
principles of freedom to contract and strict construction in favor of
an insured in construing insurance contracts.6
B. SubstantialCompliance
The theories of substantial performance and divisibility of warranties are closely allied. As an example, consider a warranty that
a building is to be guarded by a watchman. During a temporary
absence of the watchman the building catches fire and burns. Courts
have held that it was not within the contemplation of the parties at
the time the warranty was agreed to that the watchman would never
be away. The protection sought by the insurer was that of a watchman being about the premises after normal working hours in order
to lessen the danger of a fire breaking out and remaining undiscovered.
It was known by the parties that temporary absence for personal
convenience would take place. "A mere temporary absence .
would not affect the risk," according to the cort in Hanover Fire
Insurance Co. v. Gustin.7 If the risk was not affected, there has been
substantial compliance, but it is worth noting that the court also
resorts to the same fiction of giving weight to the intention of the
parties in the substantial performance situation as it will in the case
of a divided warranty. This fiction opens the way for a different type
of substantial performance from that enunciated by Shaw, "reasonably
considered equally or more efficacious"8 to what was warranted.
Thus, substantial performance has been found to be that which the
insured could reasonably be expected to do in compliance with a
continuing warranty, or that which increases the risk only a slight
degree more than it was warranted to be, or that which causes only
a temporary breach of a continuing warranty insufficient to avoid the
contract.
Substantial performance does not admit a breach of warranty as,
does the dividing of a warranty. When the court decides that there
6. Batchlor v. American Health Ins. Co., 234 S.C. 103, 107 S.E. 2d 36 (1959);
Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959).
7. 40 Neb. 828, 59 N.W. 375 (1894).
8. See note 2 supra.
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has been substantial compliance with a warranty there is no need
to consider dividing it. Yet, it is not always easy to tell under what
theory a court is proceeding, and in some cases both theories might
be or have been used. Consider a hypothetical case in which an
insured is protected both against fire loss to his buildings and against
loss by theft to its contents under a single policy requiring a watchman
to be on duty. This watchman is performing the function of protecting
against two types of risks. His presence is designed to detect a fire
that has begun and also to prevent breaking and entering by a thief.
Closer and more continuous observation of the building by the watchman is required to prevent theft than to protect against fire.9 If
the watchman is absent from the building for a short period of time
and the building catches on fire, the nature of the absence may be
such that the warranty has been complied with substantially. However, the same short absence by the watchman might breach the
warranty as to the theft coverage. This breach would require a division of the warranty that a watchman will be present, and if the loss
is by fire a court will often find that the problem is solved by
substantial performance. 0
Sometimes a warranty that a watchman will be on duty is breached
by the action of the employee hired as a watchman by his leaving
the place of duty contrary to the instructions of his employer. If the
employer-insured uses due care in hiring and instructs this watchman
that compliance with the employer's instructions will also comply
with the insurance policy warranty, the subsequent breach will be
considered to be solely due to the neglect of the watchman. In this
situation a court will usually divide the warranty and not impute
negligence or fraud to the insured by means of the master-servant
relationship, because the employer has in good faith attempted to
perform the duties required by the terms of the policy. Fault or
negligence of the employee, not the employer, was the cause of the
loss. The risk that an employee may not behave as he has been
instructed is normally a risk covered by the insurance company." The
insured has done the best that he can reasonably be expected to do,
which places the case under a facet of substantial compliance, but
it was first necessary to divide the warranty to determine what risk
was involved.
9. See Goldberg v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 145 Kan. 412, 65 P.2d 302 (1937);
Goldstein v. Royal Indem. Co., 297 Mass. 55, 7 N.E.2d 420 (1937).
10. McGannon v. Michigan Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 636, 87 N.W. 61
(1901). See also Sierra M.S. & M. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 76 Cal. 2.35, 18
Pac. 267 (1888).
11. King Buck Mfg. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 291, 41 N.E. 277 (1895);
Cowan v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 78 Cal. 181, 20 Pac. 408 (1889); Trojan Mining Co. v.
Fireman's Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 27, 7 Pac. 4 (1885); Wenzel v. Commercial Ins. Co., 67
Cal. 438,7 Pac. 817 (1885).
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C. Interpretation as Affirmative Rather Than Continuing Warranty
A promissory or affirmative warranty is one which makes a statement in the present or past tense; a continuing warranty is a promise
of the existence of the fact warranted from the date of the statement
for the duration of the policy, including a reinsurance. Since statements as to future conditions are inherently subject to greater error,
it is more favorable to the insured to construe warranties as affirmative; such is the normal tendency of the courts. When a court decides
that a warranty is severable or divisible it has determined that there
is more than one risk involved and these may be individuated.12
A consideration of whether a warranty is promissory or continuing,
on the other hand, is not addressed to the materiality of a warranty
or condition. It is a later consideration. It must be decided that a
warranty is material before it is appropriate to determine the time
at which the warranty is made. 13 Thus, there is much the same relation
between divisibility and the principle favoring construction of warranties as affirmative as between divisibility and substantial compliance.
D. "Increase of Hazard" v. "Contribute to the Loss"
Let us suppose for a moment that a warranty has been breached
at the time a loss occurs under the policy. Three possible relationships
exist between that breach and the loss itself. First, it is possible that
the breach has no bearing whatever on either the loss or the risk of
loss; in this event, the breach would generally be regarded as immaterial. Second, it is possible that the breach may increase the
risk of loss, but may not have actually caused (either in whole or in
part) the loss that actually took place. Third, the breach may have
brought about the loss. The older common law did not inquire into
the facts of a case beyond asking whether the breach existed;
if so, it was a bar to recovery on the policy. This view is now
outdated. 4 Today the controversy that exists is between the "increaseof-hazard" approach, under which recovery is barred if the breach
increases the risk of loss whether or not it actually contributes to
the particular loss, and the "contribute-to-the-loss" view under which
only those breaches which in some way cause the loss bar recovery.
A number of states have now enacted statutes which require that
12. PATTERsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 342-46;

VANCF,

INSURANCE 110 (1951).

13. Since a breach of an immaterial warranty will not prevent recovery. National
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Ord, 123 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1941); Joseph Gordon, Inc. v. Mass.
Bonding & Ins. Co., 299 N.Y. 424, 128 N.E. 204 (1920).
14. All states now inquire into materiality, many under statutes changing warranties into representations. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 766 (Smith-Hurd
1940); MAss. ANN. LA-ws ch. 175, § 186 (1959); Mn-N. STAT. § 60.85 (1946).
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a breach of warranty contribute to the loss of the insured property."5
This legislative action changes warranties from conditions limiting
and delineating risks taken in to exceptions which restrict recovery
on the basis of the cause of the insured event. The New York Standard
Fire Insurance Policy form does not cover fires caused by extended
war, internal political disturbances, acts of the government and neglect
of the insured to take measures to save the property from impending
fire. If the insured neglects to use all reasonable means to save and
preserve the insured property at and after a loss or when the property
is endangered by a nearby hostile fire, and this fire damages or
destroys the insured premises, then the cause of the damages is
neglect, which is an excepted cause, barring the insured's recovery. 6
An excepted cause must be the sine qua non of the loss, or such loss
17
did not result from an excepted cause, and the insured will recover.
Therefore, a contribute-to-the-loss statute may change a warranty
which is a condition precedent to recovery to an exception so narrow
that recovery can not be denied by a breach of this warranty.
Some differences of opinion exist concerning the application of these
statutes to moral hazard warranties. Some courts hold that a contribute-to-the-loss statute is inapplicable when there has been a
breach of provisions of the policy which are material to the risk, but
which by their very nature could not contribute to bring about the
destruction of the property. An example of such a situation would
be the wrongful concealment of the fact that other insurers had
cancelled policies on certain property, when the insured was applying
for a policy on that property. 8 This approach limits application of
a contribute-to-the-loss clause to a breach of warranty which might
have contributed to bring about the loss, but which did not.
The statutory language of legislation imposing a contribute-to-theloss limitation is not uniform. Burden of proof in showing what caused
15. IOWA CODE § 515.101 (1949), "Any condition or stipulation in an application,
policy, or contract of insurance, making the policy void before the loss occurs, shall
not prevent recovery thereon by the insured, if it shall be shown by the plaintiff that
the failure to observe such provision or the violation thereof did not contribute to the
loss." See Micr STAT. ANN. § 5327(a) (1948); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 44-358 (Supp.
1952); TEx. INS. CODE ANw. art. 6.14 (1952), "No breach or violation by the insured
of any warranty, condition or provision of any fire insurance policy, contract of insurance or application thereof, upon personal property, shall render void the policy
-or contract, or constitute a defense to a suit for loss thereon, unless such breach or
violation contributed to bring about the destruction of the property."
16. Jablonski v. Gerard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 113 N.J.L. 465, 174 At. 689
(N.J. Ct. App. 1934).
17. Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427 (1953).
18. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wilburn Boat Co., 201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953),
rev'd, 348 U.S. 310 (1955), remanded for trial, 259 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 925 (1959), remanded for trial, 199 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Tex. 1960),
rehearingdenied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
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a loss is often crucial. A fire loss usually destroys the reliable evidence
of its cause and leaves only clues for conjecture, 19 making it difficult
for either party to prove that a given breach did or did not contribute
to the loss. The Iowa type statute, although it places the burden of
proof on the insured to show that the breach of condition did not
contribute to the loss,20 is designed to allow recovery in many normal
change of use situations. A typical situation where recovery is allowed
occurs when the ground floor of a dwelling house is converted into a
cleaning and dyeing shop that contains highly flammable liquids. The
dwelling is destroyed by fire originating in a neighboring building.
The fire enters the insured dwelling through the roof and consumes
most of the building before the fire reached the flammable liquid on
the ground floor.
Applying a statute under which the burden was on the insurer to
show that the breach caused the loss, a Texas court in Texas State
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Richbourg2' held that failure to install
the required fire extinguishers was not a breach that contributed to
the loss by fire because the person reporting the fire testified that the
building was almost destroyed when he first discovered the fire. This
is at least an arguably reasonable decision, but the Liverpool Insurance Co. v. Nebraska Warehouse, Inc.' situation is not reasonable.
In this decision there was a warranty that the sprinkler system was
operative and had an adequate water supply. In fact the system had
been broken for thirteen days prior to the fire, and expert testimony
stated that an operative sprinkler would have prevented much of the
damage that occurred. Even so, the plaintiff recovered in full.
This probative burden on the insurance company is increased when
contribute-to-the-loss statutes are applied to moral hazard warranties.
An insurance company defendant must show that the insured was
motivated by the breach of warranty to cause the loss and that he
did cause it deliberately. Regardless of the warranty, the court would
not allow recovery for deliberate destruction of property, so when a
contribute-to-the-loss statute is applied to moral-hazard warranties, it
eliminates them.23 Yet, many persons who doubt the wisdom of
19. PA.TrTESON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 358.
20. IOWA CODE ANN. § 515-101 (1949).
21. 243 S.W. 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
22. 96 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 193&).
23. Some cases do not eliminate the warranty, but rather purport to recognize its
proper relation to contribute-to-the-loss statutes. In Becker v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co.,
105 Kan. 99, 181 Pac. 549 (1919), the insurer was not liable because misrepresentations as to prior claims and other insurance was material, although they could never
contribute to the contingency insured against. In McPherson v. Comden Fire Ins.
Co., 22 S.W. 211 (Tex. App. 1920), the warranty was breached as to encumbrances
and record keeping, but statute was held not applicable. The decision was followed in
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wilburn Boat Co., supranote 18.
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across the board application of contribute-to-the-loss statutes admit
that they are reasonable for use by some states in the field of moralhazard warranties. Moral hazard warranties have been deleted from
many standard fire insurance contracts and others as a means of
limiting or selecting risks. The court decisions of Texas, New Hampshire, and Nebraska in construing their statutes have had the same
effect.24 This conclusion was reached because moral-hazard warranties
injure innocent insureds so often that their beneficial effect of preventing an occasional dishonest insured from recovering is outweighed.
This note is directed toward risks of a nature usually contemplated
by both parties when the insurance policy was issued, but which
were not necessarily articulated clearly as several different risks. A
division of a warranty is made when two risks, A and B, are lumped
together under a single warranty with no policy configuration or
policy language to indicate the effect of a breach of the warranty
as to one of these risks on the other risk. If there is a breach of
warranty affecting risk B, which does not increase risk A, then a
court is clearly justified in dividing the warranty. Whenever there
is a breach of some warranty an insurer will be able to avoid
payment on the policy more easily under an increase-of-hazard
statute than under a contribute-to-the-loss statute, because a breach
may well increase the risk of loss without actually causing the loss.
The breach of warranties which actually contribute to the loss are
not within the scope of this note, other than to show why they are
excluded. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Wilburn Boat Co.15 is
an excellent vehicle for explaining these types of warranties. Article
6.14 of the Texas Insurance Code is a fairly typical contribute-to-theloss statute which was possibly applicable in the instant case. The
insured breached warranties against using the insured vessel to cary
passengers for hire, mortgaging the vessel, or selling it without consent
of the insurer, but these breaches did not contribute to the loss of
the vessel by fire while at its mooring place. However, a policy clause
said that the entire policy would be void if the insured had concealed
or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning the
insurance or the vessel insured. The insured failed to disclose both
the true nature of the boat's use and the fact that insurance had
been refused on it by other companies. The court recognized two
However, other courts apply contribute-to-the-loss statutes to any condition operating
before a loss has occurred and thereby remove moral hazard warranties from the policy.
Strahom v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 241 Iowa 997, 42 N.W.2d 903 (1950)
(transfer of a part of the insured interest); Slafter v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co.,
242 Neb. 209, 5 N.W. 612 (1932) (encumberance); Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 126
Iowa 564, 102 N.W. 502 (1905) (iron safe clause).
24. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
25. Supra note 18.
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distinct issues: (1) whether the facts concealed were material to
the risk; and (2) whether any Texas statute would prevent the court
from giving effect to the policy clause. The concealed facts were
shown to be material because a larger premium would have been
charged for the policy if the true facts had been given to the insurer.
Since several other insurers had refused to write the policy when
they knew the true facts, it is reasonable to assume that except for
the misrepresentation of such facts the policy probably would not
have been issued.
The court reasoned that misrepresentation or concealment of facts
could never contribute to the loss of property, although the facts
misrepresented or concealed could bring about the property's destruction. The clause voiding the policy for concealment or misrepresentation was aimed at assuring the insurance company that it
would have sufficient facts on which to base its premiums. This
clause was covered by article 21.16 of the Texas Insurance Code,
which says that a provision in the insurance contract making the
policy void because of misrepresentations is of no effect unless it
is shown that the matter or thing misrepresented was material to the
risk or actually contributed to the loss. Article 21.16 is broader
than article 6.14 because it goes beyond those things which actually
contribute to the loss and takes in misrepresentations of material
facts that increased the risk of loss. Article 6.14 is applicable to
physical hazards only and limits insurance companies in laying down
rules that pertain to factors causing fires and requires these factors
to contribute actually to the loss. Misrepresentation is a moral hazard,
not a physical hazard, and article 6.14 of the Texas Insurance Code
does not apply to the policy provision against concealment or misrepresentation. If the policy clause in question were within the
purview of article 6.14, then article 21.16 would have a phrase that is
meaningless, and that is not proper construction of a statute, nor is
the common law rule as to deceit changed because article 21.16
applies only to non-fraudulent misrepresentations. 26 If a false statement is made with the intent to deceive the insuror the courts generally hold that the policy is made void by the policy provision
concerning misrepresentation even if the misrepresentation relates to
a fact which did not contribute to the loss.

III.

APPLICATION OF THE

DmsiBiUrry

APPROACH

A. The Non-Warranty Situation
Breach of warranty cases are not the only ones in which courts
26. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gamier, 196 S.W. 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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have been compelled to divide policies into component parts to reach
a just result. A court's decision not to divide a policy favored the
insured in Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Lanasa,27 where
a hostile fire preceeded by an explosion destroyed the insured building. The insurer was held liable for the entire loss, although loss by
explosion was excluded in the policy. The court in Dillard v. Continental Insurance Co., made a similar decision, but the facts of
the case make it less of a construction problem than was Merrimack.
The policy excluded damage caused by perils peculiar to flying, but
a fire caused by an electrical failure in flight was included under
the clause which covered fire loss. The significance of these cases
is that they, in effect, involve the possibility of dividing the policies
according to the risks involved. In Merrimack the building's consumption by a hostile fire was complete, thereby cutting off any
intelligent consideration of how extensively the building had been
damaged by explosion before the fire. Dillard follows the Merrimack
type of reasoning by making its observation on a general level, rather
than observing whether in that particular case the electrical failure
in flight actually did cause the fire. In a non-warranty situation there
is positive coverage and the loss that it covers has taken place. The
court is not likely to read a preclusion of loss by explosion clause as
providing an intervening cause that cuts off the insurers' liability
under the insurance contract.
B. Divisibility According to Res or Multiple Res Policies
The divisibility of insurance contracts is most readily comprehended
where several items of property with separately stated values are
insured in one policy. Here the policy is susceptible of division on
its face, the inference being that the insurance was as to separate
items.2 9 States differ as to the rule which will govern whether a
policy is divisible or entire. Three distinct rules can be delineated
from the decisions. (1) If the premium is paid in gross even though
the property insured is separately valued, the contract is entire. This
view is typified by Garner v. Hawkeye Insurance Co.,30 which held
that where the premium was gross or entire the contract was not
divisible even though items were separately stated as to value because
there was only a single contract and single consideration. The separate valuation is assumed to be for the purpose of limiting the
27. 402 Va. 562, 118 S.E.2d 450 (1961).
28. 130 So.2d 489 (La. App. 1961).
29. See, e.g., such venerable and often cited cases as Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192
U.S. 149 (1904); Trakas v. Globe & R.F. Ins. Co., 141 S.C. 64, 139 S.E. 176 (1927);
Spradley v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 112 S.C. 151, 98 S.E. 285 (1919).
30. 69 Iowa 202, 28 N.W. 555 (1886).
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insurer's liability to a sum not in excess of such an amount.3' This is
a poor rule because of its reliance on the formality of the method
of premium payment, an accounting procedure, which is often not
an indication of the intention of the parties. Nor does it relate to
the risks involved in the contract for insurance. (2) More reasonable
is the view which divides the policy when the property is separately
valued even though the premium is in gross. Yet this rule, because
of its mechanistic approach, fails to match the risk against which
insurance was purchased with the condition imposed by the policy
to lessen that risk. Consider, for instance, two buildings located in

close proximity to one another, covered by the same policy, but
separately valued. If one is warranted sprinklered, will not a breach
of that warranty likely increase the risk of loss to both?- (3) The
most realistic rule permits dividing an insurance policy covering
separate risks when the warranty breached relates to one risk and not to
the other.3 The court will consider whether or not the risk was in-

creased by the breach of condition as to any particular item insured.
Each case should be decided by the courts without an attempt at
grandscale generalization. They should consider the risks involved
and the possible effects of each particular breach of condition. Thus,
even when different types of property are covered by the contract
such a personalty, buildings, different buildings, or buildings and
31. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Public Parks Amusement Co., 63 Ark. 187, 37 S.W. 959
(1896); Thomas v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 162 Mass. 29, 37 N.E. 672 (1894)
(personalty separately valued, contract held entire); Burr v. German Ins. Co., 84 Wis.
76, 54 N.W. 22 (1893). The most slavish adherence to form is when the premium
was paid. See, e.g., Harman v. American Cas. Co., 155 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1957);
Johnson v. Sun Fire Ins. Co., 3 Ga. App. 430, 60 S.E. 118 (1908); Landry Wholesale Merchantile Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 114 La. 146, 38 So. 87 (1905);
Thomas v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 163 Mass. 29, 37 N.E. 672 (1894).
32. PATTERSON, INsuRAN E 344 (1957).

33. The appropriateness of dividing a warranty in an insurance contract along these
lines has long been recognized by many states. See Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Crawford,
121 Ala. 258, 25 So. 912 (1898); Goorberg v. Western Assur. Co., 150 Cal. 510, 89
Pac. 130 (1907); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 64 Fla. 89, 59 So. 785 (1912);
People & Planter's Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Wyatt, 31 Ga. App. 684, 121 S.E. 708 (1924);
Capps v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 318 Ill. 350, 149 N.E. 247 (1925); Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Pickel, 119 Ind. 155, 21 N.E. 546 (1889); Continental Ins. Co. v. Ward, 50 Kan.
346, 31 Pac. 1079 (1893); Continental Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 335, 62
S.W. 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901); Parker-Russell Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Queen Ins. Co.,
245 S.W. 1119 (Mo. App. 1922); Johnson v. Rocky Mountain Fire Ins. Co., 70 Mont.
411, 226 Pac. 515 (1924); State Ins. Co. v. Schreck, 27 Neb. 527, 3 N.W. 340 (1889);
Jammal v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 App. Div. 145, 205 N.Y.S. 561 (1924);
Coleman v. Newv Orleans Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 310, 31 N.E. 279 (1892); Niagra Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wilkson, 150 Okla. 123, 300 Pac. 686 (1931); Oatman v. Bankers' &
Marine Mut. Fire Relief Ass'n, 66 Ore. 388, 133 Pac. 1183, rehearing denied, 66 Ore.
396, 134 Pac. 1033 (1913); Light & Co. v. Ins. Co., 105 Tenn. 480, 58 S.W. 851
(1900); Merchants' & Mfrs.' Lloyd's Ins. Exch. v. Southern Trading Co., 229 S.W.
312 (Tex. App. 1921); Bond v. National Fire Ins. Co., 83 .W. Va. 105, 97 S.E. 692
(1919).
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their contents, the modem trend is to hold that such contracts may
be divided so as to protect a portion of the property, even if the
contract is void as to another portion.- The Supreme Court of
Michigan in Benham v. Farmer's Mutual Fire Insurance Co.35 gave
a clear statement of this trend. It said that a policy for a single
premium that specified certain amounts of coverage on a farm's
dwelling, its barns, sheds, the furniture in the dwelling, products,
equipment and livestock on the premises and in certain other locations
was divisible. The insurance on the personalty was not lost by a
breach of the warranty concerning the condition of the chimneys and
of the warranty prohibiting any incumberance of the realty without
authority except so far as the personalty was contained within the
building as to which the risk was increased. Not only were separate
items involved, but also the items were of different classes, so that
the avoidance of the policy as to realty would not avoid the policy as
3
to personalty. 6
A court may be willing to divide a warranty if its breach has no
effect whatsoever on the other items insured, but the same court
may refuse to divide, and hold that a policy is entire, where the
breach of condition or warranty contributes to the loss of one item
while it increases the hazard to which other items are subjected.3
The Vermont court, addressing itself to the problem, recognized that
there were conflicting opinions, but it was willing to divide a warranty
unless "the contract is affected by some all pervading vice, such as
fraud, or some unlawful act condemned by public policy or the
common law."- 8 This reasoning explains a state's unwillingness to
divide warranties in all situations, although a policy will not usually
be held void merely because one of its warranties has been breached.
Normally a breach of warranty must be an unlawful act or be against
public policy or be fraudulent in order for it to void the entire policy.
The divisibility of warranties approach may be applied to non-physical
risks as well as to risks pertaining to physical things. As indicated, the
typical warranties made concerning physical things may be divided,
and an inspection of how this is done may be used in analyzing how to
divide warranties concerning risks which do not have physical
existence.
C. Moral Hazard Warranties
1. Ownership.-The warranty that an insured has an insurable
34. 4 APPLENAN,

INSURANCE LAW & PRA CcE § 2371 (1941).
35. 165 Mich. 406, 131 N.W. 87 (1911).
36. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Green, 36 S.W. 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
37. Goorberg v. Western Assur. Co., 150 Cal. 510, 89 Pac. 130 (1907).
38. McGowan v. People's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 54 Vt 211, 215 (1881).
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interest is considered to be continually made during the life of the
policy. Courts are not liberal in construing this warranty when the
insured has no title or interest in the property insured. Failure to have
an insurable interest in property that one insures may not affect the
physical hazards to which it is exposed, but the moral hazard inherent
in permitting this practice is typified by the person who insures a
building that he owns, sells the building, and then sets fire to the
building in order to collect the insurance money. Failure to have an
insurable interest in the property insured is against public policy,
which has been said to be sufficient to declare a policy void without
any consideration of dividing the warranties. It is instructive to look
into the possible reasons for this rule. Such a hazard can be either
material to the risk of it might contribute to the loss, but regardless
of which requirement is demanded by a court or legislature, persons
who fail to meet this continuing warranty as to insurable interest
get curt treatment from the courts. The 1918 standard fire policy
had a clause that stated in part that "if any change, other than by
death of the insured, takes place in the interest, title or possession of
the subject of insurance" the policy is void. There was also a descriptive warranty of sole ownership that is not exactly analogous to
insurable interest, but it is useful as a vehicle to discuss the development of the insurable interest warranty from the interest and possession warranty.
The "sole ownership" warranty and the "interest, title or possession"
warranty were designed to reduce the moral hazard in insuring
property, but a strict enforcement of the warranty which voided
the policy was seen by the courts to be harsh and not within the
intent of the parties. 39 Therefore the above mentioned warranties,
which were so stringently enforced in cases where there was no
ownership at all, were divided in cases where the ownership changed,
and it was obvious that the insured retained a substantial insurable
39. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Prebitero Sons, 209 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1954);
Gawecki v. Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 72 F. Supp. 430, aff'd, 167 F.2d 894
(9th Cir. 1948); Foundry Service, Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Security State Fire Ins. Co. v. Harris, 220 Ark. 900, 251 S.W. 2d 115 (1947);
Royal Ins. Co. v. Smith, 158 Fla. 472, 29 So. 2d 244 (1947); Foster-Porter Enterprises v. DeMare, 198 Md. 20, 81 A.2d 325 (1951); Strait v. Ray North, Inc., 343
Mich. 130, 72 N.W.2d 39 (1955); Sorter v. Citizens Fund Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 151 Neb.
686, 39 N.W.2d 276 (1949); Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Interstate Ins. Co., 28 N.J. Super.
81, 100 A.2d 192 (1953); Miller v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 52 N.M. 68, 191 P.2d 993
(1948); Burpo v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co., 90 Ohio App. 492, 107 N.E.2d 227 (1951);
Adalex Lab., Inc. v. Krawitz, 270 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1954); Bright v. Pittsburgh Musical
Society, 379 Pa. 335, 180 A.2d 810 (1954); Soyland v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
71 S.D. 522, 26 N.W.2d 696 (1947); Alamo Cas. Co. v. William Reeves & Co., 258
S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Cook v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ass'n., 81 S.E.2d
71 (W. Va. App. 1954).
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interest. In Clinton v. Norfolk Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,40 the conveyance by the insured of all his interest in property covered by a fire
insurance policy, except an estate for life in a house thereon, did not
void the policy on his interest, although a clause in the policy made
the policy void in case of a change in the circumstances causing an
increase in risk. There was no increase in the physical hazard, and
the court held that more than a sale of part of the property in
question was required to prove that the moral hazard had increased
as to the property in which he retained an interest. 41 The courts' willingness to divide these warranties precipitated the change of the
1918 standard policy's warranty requirement of sole ownership and
title which were concepts dependent on ownership of a physical
object to the 1943 standard policy's warranty of insurable interest.
Since the concepts of ownership of property in an amount less than a
fee simple had been a part of the law for centuries, it is surprising
that the concept of insurable interest, which was also not of recent
vintage was not expressed in a warranty at an earlier time. The
likely reason for the late arrival of insurable interest in the standard
fire policy warranties was the unwillingness of insurance companies
to abandon the old wording, which would be enforced by some courts
who took a literal approach, even though existent insurable interest
was the warranty being made in states where the courts were willing
to divide warranties.
The problem of an insurable interest is still prevalent particularly
in liability insurance because the interest is not in something that is
possessed, but is an interest in whether or not the insured may be
charged with liability for a particular occurrence. Damage to the
property is one risk, and separate from it is the liability imposed on
a person because of his relation to the property. The moral hazard
in the lack of an insurable interest in property does not have application to liability insurance since, by definition, liability insurers only
indemnify. The case of United Services Automobile Association v.
Howe2 involved a father who purchased an insurance policy on an
automobile that he gave to his son. The party injured in an accident
with the son sued the father as owner of the car, and the insurance
company declined to defend, alleging that the father's insurable
interest had terminated. The father's dealings with the car involved
in the accident were enough to convince the court that the father had
an insurable interest.
2. Additional Insurance.-A disinclination to give the policy tech40. 176 Mass. 486, 57 N.E. 998 (1900).
41. Contra, Watts v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 134 Ga. 717, 68 S.E. 479 (1910), which
refused to follow the general trend.
42. 208 F. Supp. 683 (D.Minn. 1962).

1965 ]

NOTE

nical interpretation when carried into warranty considerations protects
the interests of the insured. The problem of particularizing which
insurable interest has increased the risk of loss of what property has
not been handled satisfactorily by the courts because they have
insisted on creating a generally applicable rule, rather than attempting
to match risk and interest in a fair and just manner. Bethune v.
New York Underwriters Insurance Co. 43 and Graham v. American
Eagle Insurance Co.44 serve as starting points for examining this area.
The former case refused to divide a warranty that additional insurance
would not be purchased on the insured premises because the warranty
was a condition precedent to liability of the insurance company. However, the court allowed recovery on personal property within the
building because the mortgagor's insurance did not include personalty, therefore the policy warranty was only breached as to the
dwelling. The Bethune court was willing to make a severance of
the policy along physical lines, even though it was considering a
moral hazard warranty, and it did not seem to care that the exposure
to a moral risk was increased as to the personalty, when the risk
to the building containing the goods was so exposed. In Graham, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to divide the same sort of
warranty when a husband, co-tenant with his wife, breached the
limitation of insurance warranty. The court said that the warranty
would be breached for both tenants even though the additional insurance covered only the purchaser's interest in the property. The
husband was clearly transacting business for both his wife and himself
in the instant case, so his action could be imputed to her, since it
could be assumed that any profit to be made from firing the insured
building would be shared between them.
Moral hazard must be evaluated at two levels. At the general or
overview level the increase in moral hazard caused by one co-tenant's
over insurance will increase the hazard to the entire building, thus
justifying the court's refusal to divide the warranty according to the
insurable interest protected. This is reinforced in the case of related
co-tenants. When the problem is particularized it becomes a dual
question. First, does an increase in the moral hazard by one co-tenant
actually increase the moral hazard overall? Second, if the co-tenant's
interests are divergent and they are not related by ties more binding
than common ownership of land, is it unfair to impute the breach of
one insured to his co-tenant? Courts seem to be unanimous in holding
that the breach of warranty by one co-tenant breaches the warranty
as to both. This may appear harsh and unrealistic when applied
43. 98 F. Supp. 366 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
44. 182 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1950).
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automatically, but it has a justification. The courts only recognize
one insurable interest between the co-tenants for the purpose of
judging whether or not the limitation of insurance warranty has
been breached. When the insurance company accepts a single policy
from co-tenants, it charges a rate commensurate with the risks involved, which includes the moral hazard that one co-tenant will over
insure, and that hazard is circumscribed by a warranty limiting
insurance coverage. The premium savings accruing to co-tenants by
contracting as one insurable interest are earned at the risk of having
actions by one co-tenant void coverage on the entire tenancy. Therefore, if the co-tenants wish to be treated as two interests for the
purpose of insurance, each of the two insurable interests should
be covered by a separate policy. The courts were responsible for the
evolvement of the "sole interest" warranty into the insurable interest
requirement, but they have been mindful of the risks involved and
the cost of insuring them.
D. Books and Records
The requirement that inventory records and accounts of sales and
purchases be kept in an iron safe and that failure to produce the
books after loss will void the policy is to facilitate ascertainment of
the amount of loss on the merchandise. A breach of this condition
does not render the policy void but prevents recovery for loss on
stock in trade or merchandise. A loss on business fixtures and furniture may be recovered, even though the insured would be defeated
on the matter of recovery for the stock of goods.45 Courts seem willing
to divide this particular warranty and refuse to void a policy in toto
unless the risk of not being able to determine the total inventory
is increased. When the coverage is fire insurance, it has been held
to be enough compliance to avoid a breach of warranty if the safe was
closed, even though the combination dial was left so that the burglars
could easily rifle the safe, and during the ensuing felony a fire broke
out and destroyed the records.4 The warranty requiring a fireproof
safe was not breached because the safe was not burglar proof,47 nor
45. This is another division of warranty according to res, which has long been
recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mississippi Home Ins. Co., 72 Miss.
53, 18 So. 86 (1894); Miller v. Delaware Ins. Co., 14 Okla. 81, 75 Pac. 1121 (1904);
Sciara v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., Inc., 50 Tenn. App. 608, 362 S.W.2d 935 (1961. Many
courts do hold that a breach of iron safe and inventory warranty voids an entire
policy. See, e.g., Fields v. Queen Ins. Co., 31 Ga. App. 683, 121 S.E. 697 (1924);
Jaffe v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 116 Md. 155, 81 AtI. 281 (1911).
46. Home Ins. Co. v. Shriner. 235 Ala. 165, 177 So. 890 (1937); German American
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 75 Ark. 251, 87 S.W. 135 (1905); Siemers v. Meeme Mut. Home
Protection Ins. Co., 143 Wis. 114, 126 N.W. 669 (1910).
47. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Malone, 217 Ala. 168, 115 So. 156 (1928);
Stovall v. Sterling Fire Ins. Co., 163 La. 284, 111 So. 707 (1927).
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was there a breach of the warranty that the safe would be securely
locked, since this warranty was intended to protect the insurance company from fraudulent and erroneous claims and to aid in adjustments.
If the safe is one normally sold on the market as a fireproof safe, the
fact that it is not a challdnge to burglars is of no consequence. The
above warranty applies only to the safe-guarding of records against
fire.48 These decisions could also have been made on the basis of
substantial performance rather than on divisibility of warranty.
The same reasoning has been used where negligence of an employee
causing a warranty to be breached has been found to be a part of
the risk insured against when the iron safe clause was invoked.49
In this case a bookkeeper removed the account books and last inventory of the insured from a fireproof safe because he feared that they
might be destroyed by the fire that had broken out in the building
if they were left in the safe. As the bookkeeper ran from the
building, supposedly carrying the accounts and inventory to safety,
he dropped some of the records, and they were destroyed by fire. The
court was faced with a warranty by the insured that he would
produce the records as a condition precedent to recovering for the
loss caused by the fire. This warranty was extracted by the insurance
company to protect it against spurious claims for destroyed inventory,
and it was not designed to prevent an employee of the insured from
attempting to take the records to safety, even though this was done
in a negligent manner. The court divided the warranty by finding
that the negligence of the bookkeeper was part of the risk insured by
the insurance company, so that failure to produce the required records
based on the employee's negligence was not a bar to recovery.
At times a case is decided on the basis of substantial performance
without any mention of warranties being divided, although the decision would be a better reasoned one with fewer unanswered questions
if the divisibility of warranties had been considered. In Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Friedlander,50 a small jewelry store was insured against
loss by robbery of its merchandise, and the policy contained a warranty that there would be a custodian and one other employee in the
store. When the robbery loss occurred, one of the persons, who the
48. See, e.g., Griffin v. Implement Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 64 N.D. 146, 250
N.W. 780 (1933); London Assur. Corp. v. Poole, 212 Ala. '109, 101 So. 831 (1924);
see 114 A.L.R. 584 (1938), for comprehensive listing.
49. East Texas Fire Ins. Co. v. Harris, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 647, 25 S.W. 721 (1894);
see also note 11 supra.
50. 101 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1939). See also Foley v. Sonoma County Farmers' Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 232, 115 P.2d 1 (1941), where a policy clause caused lapse
of coverage after a dwelling had been unoccupied for ten days. Fire loss occurred
after ten days of family's two week vacation. The court concerned itself with construing the term "unoccupied" and held that there was no breach of warranty without
considering a possible division of the warranty according to the risk involved.
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insured insisted was an employee, was a window washer from a
janitorial service and regularly performed clean-up functions in the
store under the direction of the store manager. The court held that
the janitor/window washer was an employee, therefore, there were
two employees present within the store in compliance with the warranty. This differs from finding that the compliance was just as good
as having two full-time employees because the court is saying that
there were two employees, and nothing more is needed to fulfill the
warranty. No mention was made of the risks involved which the
moral-hazard warranty was designed to limit. When many small
items are involved, an insured could pretend to have been robbed
of articles which he had disposed of or which he never owned. The
presence of another employee besides the person in charge reduces
the likelihood of a faked robbery. It also increases the chance of
identifying robbers, and a regular employee might be more careful
in admitting strangers to the store, when it was not open for business.
The court neither considered these questions nor attempted to align
the risks involved with the warranty made. Although the result may
be satisfactory, the decision does not consider all of the problems
involved.
E. Occupancy

The court's willingness to divide a warranty does not always work

to the advantage of the insured. In Aiple v. Boston Insurance Co.5 1

the insured warranted that the insured dwelling house was occupied,
but it was not. A statute of the state required that the insurer
examine each structure insured, and the policy holder alleged that
by virtue of this statute the insurance company was charged with
notice that the house was not occupied as a dwelling. The court held
that the insurer was not on notice as to non-occupancy because the
statute, which became a part of the policy, was designed to force
insurance companies to fix properly a value on the structure. Thus, the
statute was intended to limit the risk of over evaluation at the inception of the policy rather than to prevent any protest or allegation of
fraud after a loss had occurred. The court decided that the risk of
over-evaluation was not involved in the warranty of occupancy, and
it was only in cases of over-evaluation that the state statute precluded
the insurance company from contesting its liability by denying that
it had actual knowledge about the dwelling.
IV. WHAT LIEs AnEAD

Thus far, it is obvious that the idea of dividing contracts of insurance so as to avoid what Nwould amount to forfeiture of coverage
51. 92 Minn. 337, 100 N.W. 9 (1904).
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is well developed and useful. In some states, the principle has now
been incorporated into statute. For instance, in New York, section
150 of the Insurance Law provides in part:
If the insurance contract specifies two or more distinct kinds of loss,
damage or injury which are within its coverage, no breach of warranty shall
avoid such contract or defeat such recovery thereunder with respect to any
kind or kinds of loss, damage or injury other than the kind or kinds to
which such warranty relates and the risk of which is materially increased

by the breach of such warranty.

Yet even in New York, problems remain in interpreting and applying
the concept. Many of these arise because of the development of new
"hybrid" policies that seem to partake of the characteristics of several
more traditional contracts. Consider, for example, the case of Wood
Patchogue Corp. v. Franklin National Insurance Co.,52 in which the
New York Court of Appeals was confronted with a jewelers block
policy. It was conceded by the named insured that certain of the
warranties had been breached at the time he suffered a fire loss. He
urged, however, that if the fire portions of the policy were considered
to be simply a "standard fire policy" incorporated into a contract which
otherwise would be thought of as an inland marine policy, these
breaches would not bar recovery. The court stated that the jeweler's
block policy was a new type of coverage, not permissible prior to
enabling legislation allowing marine insurers to give fire coverage in
their policies.5 Therefore, the court held that because the policy
did not incorporate the provisions of the standard fire policy, the
warranties of the jeweler's block policy concerning the risk of loss by
fire should be construed strictly as are inland marine warranties,
rather than as representations, as standard fire policy warranties are
construed. Thus, the policy insured against an inseparable combination of risks which could not be examined individually for a determination of whether or not there had been a breach of warranty as to any
particular risk.
In reaching this decision the court relied heavily on the new
authorization granted by the legislature which allowed insurance
companies to write both fire and marine insurance in order to find
that a new type of insurance was being written. Since this type of
insurance is sold to a special class of business man for use in their
particular business, it might be the intent of the parties, as understood
by the insured, to enter an inland marine-all risk policy without the
familiar elements of the standard fire policy. This assumes a great
deal of technical expertise on the part of the average jeweler, and
52. 5 N.Y.2d 479, 186 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1959).
53. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 46, subd. 20.
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it would also be a retreat from the original equitable purpose of
discovering the intent of the parties. Paradoxically, courts in jurisdictions without the New York statute have found the jeweler's
4
block policy to be severable into inland marine and fire portions.
In contrast to the decision in Wood Patchoque, one should consider Century Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Mers.5 5 Here, a
mortgagor tendered a "homeowners policy" to the mortgagee to
satisfy his obligation to keep the mortgaged buildings insured. This
policy was rejected by the mortgagee because a homeowner's policy
covers a number of unrelated risks in addition to the risks ordinarily
covered by the standard fire policy, and acceptance of the tendered
policy would subject the mortgagee to risks, burdens, and uncertainties
that were not contemplated in the mortgage contract. The court
held that the mortgagee was required to accept the homeowner's
policy because it was the legislature's intent in enacting section 311
of the New York Insurance Law (multiple line companies law) that
it be read together with section 168 (Standard Fire Policy), so that
an alternate form of insurance policy would be provided for homeowners, which included all of the essential virtues of the "Standard
Fire Policy." The courts held the policy to be severable because of
the nature of the agreement, the intent of the legislature and the
intent of the parties, which the court noted were more significant
factors in determining whether or not to sever a policy than matching separate premiums against separate risks covered. Continuing,
the court said, "By the very purpose and nature of the 'homeowners
policy,' severability and assignability of the fire risk coverage feature
are implicit."56
The "homeowners" policy is a combination of coverages cataloged
in section 46 of the Insurance Law, which the court stated were
able to be combined by virtue of section 311, which states capital
requirements that companies must meet depending on how many of
the coverages listed in section 46 they wish to offer. In order to
assemble a package as comprehensive as the "homeowners policy,"
it is necessary to pick parts of several of the types of coverages
listed in section 46, including a part of the marine insurance, which
was the subject of concern in Wood Patchogue. In that case the
intent of the legislature was determined to be the creation of a new
54. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Owens, 272 S.W. 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (combination policy treated as if the insured had separate policies). Contra, Motors Ins.
Co. v. Stowers, 206 Okla. 692, 246 P.2d 341 (1952).
55. 35 Misc.2d 717, 231 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1962), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 795, 236
N.Y.S.2d 939 (1963).
56. 35 Misc.2d 717, 722, 231 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71 (1962), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 795,
236 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1963).
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type of insurance by considering only section 46. No mention was
made there of any legislative intent to assist flexible and realistic
writing of insurance as in Century. It is unlikely that a jeweler who
had a standard fire policy, plus several other policies would think
that he was buying a new type of policy that had interconnecting
risks and did not give him the same protection against technical
and harsh interpretations of his insurance policy, when he purchased
a jewelers block policy to take their place. Probably, the new policy
was brought to his attention by an insurance salesman, who pointed
out that a convenient all-in one policy would cost less than his present
coverage.
Moreover, once it has been determined appropriate to divide a
policy along the lines of risk, whether as a matter of statue or of
common law, there is the problem of how to subdivide the risks
covered. An extreme example is Diesinger v. American & Foreign
Insurance Co.,57 where a jewelers block policy, insuring against all
risks, contained a warranty that when the insured jewelry store was
open for business the maximum value of the display in any one show
window would be 5,000 dollars. The store was robbed by two armed
gunmen at mid-day, when the display window contained jewelry
worth 7,891 dollars, and the remainder of the stock, which was also
taken, was in showcases or in the store's vault. The insurance company argued that since an express warranty had been breached the
insured should not recover, but the court held that the warranty
related only to the risk of loss by window smashing and not to
hold-up loss. One can hardly help wondering just how the court
divined the nature of the insurer's intent. Surely there might be
speculation contrary to that of the court that excessive display of
jewelry in general attracts theft.
Thus the problem remains: How can one best determine which
warranties relate to which risks? Moreover, it is a problem which
seems immune to precise statutory solution, since preparation of
statutes to determine the proper results for each type of case we
have surveyed plus those which one can envision would be an overwhelmingly detailed task. If there is to be a satisfactory resolution
of the problem, it seems most likely that it will be along the line
suggested by Professor Patterson some years ago: The acceptance by
insurers of the concept of divisibility, and the preparation by them
57. 138 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1943). See also Karp v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.,
134 Pa. Super. 514, 4 A.2d 529 (1939); Smith v. Denn Township Ass'n, 323 Pa. 93,
186 Ad. 130 (1936) ("While occupied as a dwelling not relevant to insurance on contents of building.") This may be going too far. Contra, Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. 193 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1952); Oates v. Continental Ins.
Co., 137 W. Va. 501, 72 S.E.2d 886 (1952), where severability was denied.
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of contracts which reasonably reflect this acceptance. 58 That this is
not an unlikely turn of events is suggested by what has happened
in the standard automobile policy.
Automobile insurance encompasses several events against which

the insured has purchased protection. These events are as much
different risks that are separately covered as are different types of
property in a fire policy. Bodily-injury liability, property-damage
liability, collision, theft, and fire are only part of the possible coverages, but they are sufficient to show clearly that several different
possible events are covered. If an insured breached a condition
against encumbering his automobile, this is relevant only to the
coverage of events causing damage to the insured car. Even if that
coverage were voided, a court may hold that such a breach is
irrelevant to the coverage for bodily-injury liability to a third person.
The encumberance provision is related to a moral hazard and does
not increase the probability that an insured will negligently injure
third persons.5 9 On the basis of this reasoning the Standard Provisions
(1955) for automobile insurance expressly state that encumberance
provisions are applicable only to the coverages dealing with harm

to the insured's car.60 In recent years there has been an increase in
58. PATrERsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 346.

59. Pauli v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 167 Misc. 417, 4 N.Y.S.2d 41, af'd,
255 App. Div. 935 (1938), leave to appeal denied, 280 N.Y. 853 (1939). See also
Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Lantz, 246 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1957); Ocean Ace. & Guar.
Corp. v. Bear, 220 Ala. 491, 125 So. 676 (1929); Sly v. American Indem. Co., 127 Cal.
App. 212, 15 P.2d 522 (1932); Mid-State Ins. Co. v. Brandon, 340 Ill. App. 470, 92
N.E.2d 540 (1950); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 AtI. 136
(1931); Hunt v. Century Indem. Co., 58 R.I. 336, 192 Atl. 799 (1937); Kuntz v.
Spence, 48 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 67 S.W.2d 254
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Hanson, 42 Wash. 2d 2,56, 254 P.2d 494
(1953). There is a small but growing group of cases which hold that warranties of
ownership, if breached, are material to the risk of property damage or loss by theft,
but which question whether the risk of the liability insurer is increased if the person
insured does not own the vehicle covered by the property insurance. Opposed to this
position are quite a number of cases that refuse to divide warranties as to property and
liability risks, particularly when a warranty against encumbrances is involved. See,
e.g., Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 318 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1963); Didlake v.
Standard Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1952); Associated Indem. Corp. v. MeAlexander, 168 Tenn. 424, 79 S.W.2d 556 (1935), which held that it was material to
the insurance company's acceptance of risks that it knowingly insured automobiles that
were encumbered.
The modern trend of dividing warranties by property risks and liability risks is
strongest in the cases where a father owns a car, takes out insurance and later gives the
car to his minor child for use by the child. While the ownership relationship is
changed, liability insurance to protect the father is needed in the same amount as
before. There is a real and continuing financial interest on the part of the father in
having himself covered by an adequate amount of liability insurance, whether the
car is registered in his name or not. Thus, the selection of risk argument is not applicable here, unless the insurers were in some way defrauded about who would be the
principal user.
60. PArEnsRoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 345.
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coverages that are designed to protect against losses that can not be
recovered in a court action. One such coverage is payment of medical
expenses for persons who have a disability to sue the insured at
common law (relatives). Another coverage is to protect against
damage and injury by an uninsured motorist who injures the policy
holder, passengers in his vehicle, or his property. The latter coverage
concerns a risk so completely beyond the insured's control that he
should probably recover for damage done to his automobile, even
61
though he had violated the warranty against encumberances.
This is not to say that specifying in the policy the coverage to be
affected by a particular breach of warranty would solve all problems.
The issue of materiality would still have to be dealt with, and no
doubt some companies might attempt on occasion to stretch the
logical relation between a breach and a particular coverage beyond
the limits of reason. But at least a recognition in the policy of the
possibility of division would provide the courts with an issue much
more clearly drawn than is often now the case. To state it briefly,
the issue would change a two-fold one (Is it proper in this case to
decide that a given warranty does not bear on all risks covered? If
so, to what risks does it bear a logical relation?) to a single question
(Is the breach involved in this case material to the risk to which
the policy says it relates?).
The need for such a course of action is increasingly obvious. A
recent advertisement in the Wall Street Journal by Fireman's Fund
American Insurance Companies begins:
"Now one policy covers all these risks-Rates them individually
for the lowest premium cost!" Their Portfolio Policy is advertised
to protect against burglary, "And also covers buildings, stock, equip61. Many courts*will sever automobile policy warranties of notice, although in order
to do so it is often necessary to rely on other types of insurance cases. E.g., Rhine v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 120, 289 N.Y.S. 117 (1936); Donley v. Glenn
Falls Ins. Co., 184 N.Y. 107, 76 N.E. 914 (1906). Such severances will often be
geared to the type of damage involved in an accident. The customary requirements
placed on an automobile owner as a policy holder are that he give notice of any accident
and forward all papers involving a law suit to the insurance company. The great
weight of authority holds that an insured cannot recover if the liability policy expressly
makes notice to the insurer a condition precedent to liability and the insured fails to
give such notice. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 131,
216 P.2d 606 (1950).
Even where an express statement requiring notice is not in the policy there is a trend

toward making such notice a condition precedent to the insurer's liability. See, e.g.,
Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co., 256 Wis. 356, 41 N.W.2d 359 (1950). The opposing
view is that absent an express clause requiring notice, delay will not result in an

automatic forfeiture; but it will postpone the day of recovery.

See, e.g., Leach v.

Farmer's Auto. Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 920 (1950).

This is

a division of the notice warranty to an extent, but it is directed more to purely hardship
amelioration than to an ascertainment of the risks covered by the particular warranty.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

EVOL. 18

ment, business, interruption, liability, medical payments, employee
dishonesty, robbery, theft, transportation, and other optional coverages as needed." The advertisement states that a policy holder can
save money with this policy because it is written to fit an individual's
business and his hazards are individually rated so that he does not,
"pay for someone else's dangerous risks or poor management." Assuming that the advertised benefits of individuation of risks are made
a part of the policy it is accurate to say that this was the intent of
the parties, when the contract was made. This built-in divisibility
reinforces the decision of the courts to consider the risks as divisible,
and it is a forward looking step by an insurance company.6 2 It has
been generally agreed that a court's decision to divide an insurance
contract is based on equitable principles, whereby the courts avoid
harsh technical forfeitures of the insured's claim, and that the
explanation that the court is merely carrying out the intention of
the parties is a fiction. This can be said with some certainty since no
purchaser of such a "simplified" policy would expect to be subjected to more technical defenses than would be the case had he
purchased separate policies. One can also say with equal certainty
that courts are unlikely to enforce clauses stating that a breach of
any condition will avoid the entire policy.6 Thus, divisibility of
the application of warranties is present, whether desired or not. Is
it unreasonable, therefore, to expect that insurers who devise these
multiple risk policies will in time link warranties and coverages
more and more specifically? Not at all; it is already being done, with
the automobile policy the most familiar example. It is to the advantage of both insurer and insured to have these matters spelled
out clearly. Such a course of action should decrease litigation, and
reduce ill will.
This note ends, therefore, on much the same thought as that with
which it began. It is the company which writes the policy, not the
insured. If the policy conditions seem to a court unreasonable or
ambiguous, it will interpret them to favor the insured-and so it
should. One of these methods of beneficent interpretation has been,
and will continue to be, dividing policies when not to do so would
be to deprive an insured of recovery when he has breached a warranty not relevant to the loss he has suffered. The only question,
then, is whether the insurers who issue multiple risk policies will see
fit to accept the concept of divisibility and write it into these policies
RsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 346; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 110.
63. Another approach is seen in Pugh v. Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 195 F.2d
83 (3d Cir. 1952), where Pennsylvania divides warranties by separating them into
warranties which must be literally satisfied and conditions which will not avoid the
policy unless their breach are material.
62. PAT
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explicitly. There is ample precendent in present underwriting for
doing so. Doing so would clarify the positions of the parties, and
aid the courts in defining the issues in litigation. It is difficult to
understand what would be lost.
JERALD

H. SxiAR

